Alex Christensen is a
graduate of Washington University in St. Louis. There, he was an
economics and political science student who developed a keen interest in renewable
energy, macroeconomics, and the role of institutions in public policy.
He has written for
Americans for Energy Leadership and Minnesota 2020. Since graduating, he has
worked for a Fortune 50 company and as a public servant. This fall, he will be pursuing
graduate studies in economics at London School of Economics. If you're ever
looking for a bassist in your band, Alex is also the guy for you.
For much of 2012, the
wind power industry was in 'hurry-up-and-wait" mode. There was tremendous
uncertainty over the future of the Production Tax Credit, which was set to
expire on December 31, 2012. Not knowing the "rules of the game" for
2013 and beyond, wind investors and developers responded by curtailing their
plans for growth in 2013. This is a classic example of institutional
uncertainty on growing industries. For wind power in the United States, this is
just the latest example of a longstanding detrimental institutional structure -
and is responsible for the lag behind other developed nations in renewable
energy adoption.
2012 was a banner year
for wind power. 12,620 MW of wind capacity was deployed, making it the biggest
year yet for the industry. At first glance, this seems to show that growth in
the United States’ wind sector is accelerating and the policy framework is
accommodating. But as is often the case in the social sciences, initial
suspicions can be misleading. The surge in American wind power installations in
2012 is in fact a product of rather inept institutional structure, and because
of that 2013 is predicted to be a lackluster year for the industry.
Two vital pieces of
evidence point to the political disconnect that is generating uncertainty in
the wind industry. First, the future of the Production Tax Credit for renewable
energy remained in limbo for most of 2012 – only to be extended through 2013 in
the January 2nd Fiscal Cliff deal. The months-long wait for the PTC
extension caused an uncertainty-fueled panic among wind developers to complete
any current projects in 2012 in order to receive the PTC – then hope that 2013
would be more promising.
The second point
illustrates the mad dash to put wind turbines into operation before the end of
the 2012. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately
40% of the total capacity additions in 2012 occurred in December –the month the
PTC was set to expire. No month of 2012 tallied more than 1.5 MW put outside of
the over 5 MW in December.
So if the PTC was
extended through the end of 2013, why is growth in wind expected to slow this
year? Because planning, building, and getting a wind farm into operation takes
quite a bit of time. Building and installing turbines does not happen
instantaneously, but might seem like it compared to the time it takes to find
financing and navigate the complex permitting process. I’ve spoken with wind
developers in Minnesota who say it can easily take an entire year to receive
approval attach new turbines to the the Midwest Independent Transmission System
Operator (MISO) grid.
At the heart of the
recent experience of the wind industry is a dramatic increase in uncertainty. In
the sense that it faces uncertainty in general, wind is not unique. Agriculture
can be hurt by unexpected droughts; retailers can be hurt by recessions cause
by financial crises. Wind power developers have always experienced uncertainty
in the same vein – they can run into fervent NIMBYism when planning projects
and other energy sources can become relatively less expensive. But the kind of
uncertainty that the wind industry experienced in 2012 is of a different
nature: institutional uncertainty.
2013’s ‘Rules of the
Game’ were in limbo for months, and were only codified on January 2nd,
2013. At a theoretical level, the actual impact of the PTC – a credit of $.022
per kWh – would likely be real but small. Its most likely effect would be to
funnel wind developers’ installation efforts towards a concentrated number of
highly profitable sites (those with lower installation costs and higher wind
speeds).
By not extending (or
explicitly ending) the PTC, the United States federal government magnified the
effects of a potential $.022 decrease in per kWh revenue. Suddenly, it becomes
more difficult for investors to evaluate the industry, especially in a risk-averse
market (which many investors still are after the Recession of 2009). The range
of expectations about returns on investment grows, and drives some investors
out of the wind market. For those who are still willing to invest, the
increased uncertainty leads to demand for higher interest rates in order to
make expected returns positive.
Some industries maybe
would have only been minimally impacted by uncertainty of this nature, but wind
is not one of them. Investment is a vital component of the wind industry. Once
a wind turbine is in the ground, it is almost free to produce power, but the
costs to get it in there are steep. Wind farms can come with a price tag of
$500 million, and unless developers can find funding they will not be able to start
their endeavors. The up-front capital costs are recouped as the turbines spin
and create a revenue stream, but all of the turbines must be purchased before
then.
Having seen how the end
of 2012 played out – a dramatic effort on the part of wind developers to put
their turbines into operation while they knew they would still receive the PTC,
leaving fewer than desirable projects in the pipeline – provides guidance on
how public policy can inhibit the growth of new industries. It also gives
policymakers a chance to design a program that does not create the same
problems for the wind industry. Cementing the PTC as a permanent program would
certainly do this, but it may be politically difficult. Another solution would
be to set a date on the middle-term horizon (say, 8 or 10 years from now) by
which the PTC would be eliminated. Between now and then, the PTC would
gradually fall to zero. Under this plan, the institutional message to the wind
industry would be that regulation and subsidies will be undertaken in a
deliberate and predictable fashion.
The wind industry’s
experience with the PTC is just one of numerous examples of policymaking
creating uncertainty, but it serves as a tremendous illustration of how inaction
on a relatively small piece of the institutional framework can interrupt an
industry. In the case of wind power, which is generally considered a ‘good’
industry – and one that the United States already lags behind its developed
peers in – uncertainty has led to layoffs in wind-heavy states like Iowa and
Minnesota and poor prospects for 2013.
Hello we Can supply Aviation Kerosene, Jet fuel (JP 54-A1,5), Diesel (Gas Oil) and Fuel Oil D2, D6,ETC in FOB/Rotterdam only, serious buyer should contact or if you have serious buyers
ReplyDeletemy seller is ready to close this deal fast contact us below: now base email us severgazinvest@inbox.ru
PRODUCT AVAILABLE IN ROTTERDAM/ CI DIP AND PAY IN SELLER EX-SHORE TANK.
Russia D2 50,000-150,000 Metric Tons FOB Rotterdam Port.
JP54 5000,000 Barrels per Month FOB Rotterdam.
JA1 Jet Fuel 10,000,000 Barrels FOB Rotterdam.
D6 Virgin Fuel Oil 800,000,000 Gallon FOB Rotterdam.
E-mail: paveleriks@mail.ru
Phone via WhatsApp/
Call +79167856894
Best Regards